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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the effect of a carbon price on wholesale electricity prices 
and carbon-pass-through rates in the states comprising the Australian National 
Electricity Market (NEM). The methodology utilize an agent-based model, which 
contains many features salient to the NEM including intra-state and inter-state 
transmission branches, regional location of generators and load centres and ac­
commodation of unit commitment features. The model uses a Direct Current 
Optimal Power Flow (DC OPF) algorithm to determine optimal dispatch of gen­
eration plant, power flows on transmission branches and wholesale prices. The 
results include sensitivity analysis of carbon prices on wholesale prices and car­
bon pass-through rates for different states within the NEM.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Policies to abate carbon emissions have a range of economic impacts. Of central concern 
to governments has been the impact of such policies on the price of electricity. Fast rising electricity 
prices are politically damaging because they tend to affect low income groups disproportionately 
but rising electricity price also provides an incentive to reduce carbon emissions. Australia is an 
interesting case study in this regard, having introduced a relatively high $23/tC02 carbon price in 
2012. Prior to the introduction of this policy, compensation was provided to low- and middle- 
income groups to cover the anticipated transmission in price rises from wholesale to retail prices. 
But what exactly is the effect of a carbon price on wholesale electricity prices? This paper provides 
an answer to this question.
Understanding of and estimation of the carbon pass-through rate is essential to estimating 
the interaction between the carbon price and electricity prices and assessing the need, scope and 
role of industry assistance, including partial or complete allocation of free permits (e.g. ‘grandfath­
ering’) (Reinaud 2007, Chen et al. 2008, Chemyavs’ka and Gulli 2008 , Freebairn 2008, Sijm et 
al. 2008, Simshauser 2008, Menezes et al. 2009, Simshauser and Doan 2009, Kim et al. 2010, 
Nelson et al. 2010, Sijm et al. 2012).
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This article examines carbon pass-through in Australia but this issue is of interest in many 
other countries, as many countries or states have or are planning to adopt carbon pricing. The Kyoto 
Protocol allows flexibility over mechanisms used by signatory countries to meet their emission 
targets. For instance, emission trading allows countries that exceed emission reduction targets to 
sell excess greenhouse gas permits to deficit countries, which links Emission Trading Schemes 
(ETSs) into an international market (Parliament of Australia 2013). Currently, there are several 
ETSs operating including the European Union (comprising 31 countries), Switzerland, New Zea­
land, Australia, Japan and Kazakhstan. Significant state based schemes include: USA Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (nine eastern states including New York and Massachusetts); Western 
Climate Initiative (five USA and Canadian states including California, Quebec and British Colum­
bia); Japan (Metropolitan scheme in Tokyo and provincial scheme in Saitama Prefecture); and 
Canada (Alberta). Proposed schemes include: China (seven provinces and cities including Beijing 
and Shanghai); Republic of Korea, Belarus, Brazil, India, and Mexico (Sterk and Mersmann 2011, 
Climate Commission 2013, DIICCSRTE 2013, Evans et al. 2013, Parliament of Australia 2013).
We use an agent-based model of the NEM called the Australian National Electricity Market 
(ANEM) model to estimate the carbon pass-through rate, so evaluating the relationship between 
carbon prices and wholesale electricity prices. ANEM's methodology assumes an Independent 
System Operator (ISO) and uses Locational Marginal Pricing (LMP) to price energy by the location 
of its injection into, or withdrawal from, the transmission grid. ANEM is based on the American 
Agent-Based Modelling o f Electricity Systems (AMES) model (Sun and Tesfatsion 2007a, 2007b). 
The ANEM model fully reflects the differences between the institutional structures of the Australian 
and USA wholesale electricity markets.1
We consider that the fuel-mix of the market will be of greater importance in ultimately 
determining carbon pass-through rates while acknowledging wholesale market structure could affect 
pass-through estimates, such as the transparency and bidding behaviour in day-ahead and balancing 
markets of a net pool market as in the USA. However, the gross pool market structure of the NEM 
provides advantage in estimating carbon pass-through rates because this market structure most 
closely matches the framework underpinning discussion of carbon pass-through in the broader 
literature.
The wholesale market of the NEM is a real time, ‘energy only’ market and a separate 
market exists for ancillary services (AEMO 2010). The ANEM model uses a DC OPF algorithm 
to determine optimal dispatch of generation plant, power flows on transmission branches and whole­
sale prices. The ANEM model accommodates: intra-state and inter-state power flows; regional 
location of generators and load centres; demand bid information; accommodation of unit commit­
ment features including variable generation costs, thermal limits, ramping constraints, start-up costs 
and minimum stable operating levels.
The next section examines carbon pass-through, the impact of carbon prices on wholesale 
electricity prices and claims made for industry assistance. Section 3 provides an outline of the 
ANEM model. Section 4 discusses implementation issues of the ANEM model. Sections 5 and 6, 
respectively, analyse the sensitivity of the wholesale price and carbon pass-through rate to carbon 
price. Section 7 discusses policy implications and Section 8 offers conclusions.
2. CONCEPT OF CARBON PASS-THROUGH
Carbon pass-through can be defined as the incidence of a fixed carbon price or tradable 
carbon permit and refers to the proportion of carbon price (expressed in $/tC02) that is passed into
1. See Wild et al. (2012a), Section 1, for further details.
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wholesale electricity spot prices (expressed in $/MWh) (Nelson et al. 2010). The carbon pass­
through rate is influenced by:
• Emissions intensity of the existing capital stock (Simshauser and Doan 2009, Kim et al. 
2010, Nelson et al. 2010).
• Demand and Supply elasticities (Chen et al. 2008, Freebaim 2008, Menezes et al. 2009, 
Nelson et al. 2010, Sijm et al. 2012).
• Economics of existing substitutes allowing a switch from high to low carbon emission 
forms of generation (Simshauser and Doan 2009, Nelson et al. 2010).
• Availability of offsets or international credits (Nelson et al. 2010).
• Market competition, e.g. whether the market is competitive or characterised by oligop­
olistic or monopolistic structures (Chernyavs’ka and Gulli 2008, Nelson et al. 2010, 
Sijm et al. 2012).
Most carbon pass-through rate calculations make simplifying assumptions such as perfect 
competition and ignore transmission branch congestion and the spatial location of generators and 
demand centres within the transmission grid. Such calculations fail to consider market power and 
constraints other than generator capacity limits and least cost production. Least cost production 
involves dispatching the generator with lowest marginal cost first, followed by the generator with 
the next lowest marginal cost, and so on, (Sijm et al. 2006, Chen et al. 2008, Sijm et al. 2012). 
However, ‘out of order’ dispatch can arise under the following circumstances: when market power 
is exercised; account is taken of transmission and unit commitment features; the level of the carbon 
price changes the merit order and marginal generator; or the carbon price produces a demand 
response (Sijm et al. 2006, Chen et al. 2008).
Carbon price investigations in Australia fall within two broad categories: economy-wide 
and specific electricity industry studies. Economy-wide studies typically utilise Competitive General 
Equilibrium (CGE) modelling where full carbon pass-through is assumed (Allen Consulting 2006, 
Garnaut (2008, 2011a), Prime Ministerial Taskforce 2008, Department of Treasury 2011). Specific 
electricity industry studies usually model the wholesale electricity market using linear programming 
(MMA 2006, ROAM (2008, 2011), SKM-MMA 2011, ACIL Tasman 2012).
Many of these studies investigate carbon pass-through indirectly where wholesale elec­
tricity price are presented relative to a ‘Business-As-UsuaP (BAU) benchmark without explicitly 
calculating the carbon pass-through rate (MMA 2006, NETT 2006, ROAM 2008, Garnaut 2011b). 
Later reports have been more likely to explicitly calculate the carbon pass-through rate, which 
reflects a growing concern over wholesale electricity price increases induced by a carbon price 
(Department of Treasury 2011, ACIL Tasman 2012).
Nelson et al. (2010) in a survey of Australian carbon pass-through rates find that state 
emission factors measured in (tC02/MWh), including the contribution of wind generation, produced 
a variable set of outcomes with Victoria (VIC) having the largest emissions intensity factor of 1.23 
while Tasmania (TAS) had the lowest of 0.32. The emissions intensity factors for Queensland (QLD) 
and New South Wales (NSW) were 0.89 and 0.90 respectively while for South Australia (SA) it 
was 0.72, which reflects SA’s higher concentration of wind generation. The NEM wide weighted 
average emissions intensity factor was 0.94.
Nelson et al. (2010) also demonstrate that Australian estimates of carbon pass-through 
varied significantly from 17% to 128% with a mean of 93.4% for stable generator bidding strategies. 
When capital stock ‘fixity’ is assumed, higher range values are found (Freebaim 2008). Department 
of Treasury (2011, p. 126) cite SKM-MMA (2011) and ROAM (2011) who estimate an aggregate
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carbon pass-through rate of 0.85. ACIL Tasman (2012, p. 27) estimate State carbon pass-through 
rates of: 0.83 (QLD), 0.91 (NSW), 0.68 (VIC), 0.63 (SA) and 0.48 (TAS). VIC’s low pass-through 
rate results from competition with SA’s low emission intensive gas and wind generation and with 
NSW’s and TAS’s hydro generation (ACIL Tasman 2012, p. 47).
Investigations of the EU ETS indicate that carbon pass-through rates are broadly correlated 
with average emission intensity levels. Reinaud (2007), Sijm et al. (2008), Kim et al. (2010) and 
Nelson et al. (2010) provide an overview of methods and carbon pass-through estimates.
In principle, two types of carbon pass-through rates have been identified in the literature: 
add-on and work-on. The ‘add-on’ pass-through rates are the carbon intensity rates of generators 
(Sijm et al. 2006). In comparison, the ‘work-on’ pass-through rates indicate how much of the carbon 
price is passed onto wholesale electricity prices. This work-on rate is dependent on each generator’s 
carbon intensity or add-on rate, the merit order of dispatch, transmission constraints, unit commit­
ment features, location of demand centres and generators and fuel-mix of generators located in 
different regions or nodes.
Significant levels of carbon pass-through indicate that consumers are bearing a large pro­
portion of the carbon price/tax while a low rate indicates that producers are bearing a high proportion 
of the incidence of the carbon price/tax (Nelson et al. 2010). A high carbon pass-through rate also 
mitigates claims of generators for compensation as they pass these increased costs onto consumers 
in the form of higher wholesale electricity prices (Freebairn 2008).
Assuming competitive least cost dispatch, carbon pass-through rates can be compared with 
the emissions intensity factor of individual generators. This gives an indication of whether the 
wholesale electricity price increases confronting generators will be sufficient to cover their incre­
mental carbon cost liabilities. If the carbon pass-through rate is less than a generator’s emissions 
intensity factor, the generator will face a loss of market share and asset value relative to BAU. Their 
profitability will be eroded because growth in revenue attributable to increases in wholesale elec­
tricity prices will be less than carbon cost increases (Sijm et al. 2006, Freebairn 2008, Simshauser 
2008, Simshauser and Doan 2009, Lambie 2010, Nelson et al. 2010). This reasoning has under­
pinned debate about the need, role and potential scope of grandfathering. However, Gamaut (2008) 
argued against this position because there is no history or precedent for compensating private sector 
owners of capital for loss of asset value associated with any other public or regulatory policy. 
Furthermore, the use of a carbon price policy instrument cannot be viewed as unanticipated by 
investors because concern over climate change has been around since the 1970’s and use of carbon 
pricing mechanisms since the early 1990’s (Menezes et al. 2009).
3. PRINCIPAL FEATURES OF THE ANEM MODEL
In this section, we provide an outline of the core features of the ANEM model which are:
1. The wholesale power market includes an ISO and energy traders that include demand 
side agents called Load-Serving Entities (LSE’s) and generators distributed across the 
nodes of the transmission grid.
2. The transmission grid is an alternating current (AC) grid modelled as a balanced three- 
phase network.
3. The ANEM wholesale power market operates using increments of one hour.
4. The ANEM model ISO undertakes daily operation of the transmission grid within a 
single settlement system, which consists of a real time market settled using LMP.
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5. For each hour of the day, the ANEM model’s ISO determines power commitments 
and LMP’s for the spot market based on generators’ supply offers and LSE’s demand 
bids which are used to settle financially binding contracts.
6. Transmission grid congestion in the spot market is managed via the inclusion of 
congestion components in the LMP.
The transmission grid contains 72 branches and 53 nodes (see Figures 1 to 5 in Wild et 
al. 2012a) covering QLD, NSW, VIC, SA and TAS where the States are linked by the following 
interconnectors: QNI and Directlink linking QLD and NSW; Tumut-Murray linking NSW and VIC; 
Heywood and MurrayLink linking VIC and SA; and Basslink linking VIC and TAS.
The major power flow pathways in the model reflect the major transmission pathways 
associated with 275, 330, 500, 275 and 220 KV transmission branches in QLD, NSW, VIC, SA 
and TAS, respectively. Key transmission data required for the transmission grid relate to an assumed 
base voltage value in kilovolts ( kV), base apparent power in three-phase megavoltamperes (MVA), 
branch connection and direction of flow information, maximum thermal rating of each transmission 
branch in megawatts (MW) and transmission branch reactance in ohms (Sun and Tesfatsion 2007a, 
Section 2.2). Base apparent power is set to 100 MVA, an internationally recognized value. Thermal 
ratings of transmission lines and reactance values were supplied by the QLD, NSW and TAS 
transmission companies Powerlink, Transgrid, and Transend. For VIC and SA, the authors used 
values based on the average values associated with comparable branches in the three above states.
A LSE is an electric utility that has an obligation to provide electrical power to end-use 
consumers (residential, commercial or industrial). The LSE agents purchase bulk power in the 
wholesale power market each day in order to service customer demand (load) in a downstream 
retail market. We assume that retail demands exhibit negligible price sensitivity reducing to daily 
supplied load profiles (Sun and Tesfatsion 2007b).
Hourly regional load data for QLD and NSW was derived using regional load traces 
supplied by Powerlink and Transgrid. This data was then re-based to the state demand totals pub­
lished by AEMO for the ‘QLD1’ and ‘NSWF markets (AEMO 2013). For the other three states, 
regional shares were determined from terminal station load forecasts contained in the annual plan­
ning reports published by the transmission companies Transend (TAS), Vencorp (VIC) and 
ElectraNet (SA). These regional load shares were then interpolated to a monthly time series using 
a cubic spline technique and then multiplied by the ‘TAS1’, ‘VICE and ‘SA1’ state demand time 
series published in AEMO (2013) to derive regional load profiles for TAS, VIC and SA.
The “demand” published in AEMO (2013) is termed ‘scheduled demand’, which is the 
output of scheduled and semi-scheduled generation, transmission losses and large independent loads 
directly connected to the transmission grid. This is a net demand concept calculated from gross 
demand, after contributions from small scale solar PV and wind and large scale non-scheduled 
generation (including wind, hydro and bagasse generation) has been netted off to produce the net 
demand concept (AEMO 2012b).
Generators are assumed to produce and sell electrical power in bulk at the wholesale level. 
Each generator agent is configured with a production technology with assumed attributes relating 
to feasible production interval, total variable and marginal cost functions and fixed costs. Depending 
upon plant type, start-up costs might also be incurred. Each generator also faces MW ramping 
constraints that determine the extent to which real power production levels can be increased or 
decreased within the hourly dispatch horizon. Production levels determined from the ramp up and 
ramp down constraints must fall within the minimum and maximum thermal MW capacity limits 
of each generator.
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The MW production and ramping constraints are defined in terms of ‘energy sent out’— 
i.e. energy available to service demand. In contrast, variable costs and carbon emissions are cal­
culated from the ‘energy generated’ production concept which is defined to include energy sent out 
plus a typically small amount of additional energy that is produced internally as part of the power 
production process. Variable costs of each generator are modelled as a quadratic function of hourly 
real energy produced by each generator (Sun and Tesfatsion 2007b). The variable cost concept 
employed incorporates fuel, variable operation and maintenance (VO&M) costs and carbon cost 
components. Fuel, VO&M and carbon emissions/cost parameterisation was determined using data 
published in ACIL Tasman (2009) for thermal plant and from information sourced from hydro 
generation companies for hydro generation plant.2
Optimal dispatch, wholesale prices and power flows on transmission branches are deter­
mined in the ANEM model by a DC OPF algorithm. The DC OPF algorithm utilised is that de­
veloped in Tesfatsion and Sun (2007a) and involves representing the standard DC OPF problem as 
an augmented strictly convex quadratic programming (SCQP) problem, involving the minimization 
of a positive definite quadratic form subject to linear equality and inequality constraints. The so­
lution values are the real power injections and branch flows associated with the energy production 
levels for each generator and voltage angles for each node.
Formally, the DC OPF algorithm employed in the model is:
Minimize Generator-reported total variable cost and nodal angle differences 
/ r 1
X [A ,PGi + B , P l ) +  71 X <% + X  [S k- S mY  ,
km e BR,k >2
with respect to real-power production levels and voltage angles 
Pc_, i = l , . . . , / ;  Sk, k = 2 ,...,K , subject to 
• Real power balance (equality) constraint for each node k= 1 ,... ,K (with 8X =0): 
0 = PLoadk—PGenk + PNetInjectk, 
where
■ PLoadk -  PL (e-g- aggregate power take-off at node k),
j * J k 1
■ PGenk ~ X  Pg (e-g- aggregate power injection at node k),
i e l k
■ PNetInjectk= X  F k„n
km or mk e BR
• Fkm -  Bkn\dk-d,„\ [e.g. real power flows on branches connecting nodes ‘k’ and ‘m’ (Sun 
and Tesfatsion 2007a, Section 3.1)].
• Real power thermal (inequality) constraints for each branch km e BR k = 1__ ,K (with
<5i=0):
Fkm> — F™, (lower bound constraint: reverse direction MW branch flow limit) 
Fkm<Fkl%, (upper bound constraint: normal direction MW branch flow limit).
• Real-power production (inequality) constraints for each Generator i = 1 ,...,/:
Pg.>P'cR., (lower bound constraint: lower hourly MW thermal ramping limit)
PG< PGf  (upper bound constraint: upper hourly MW thermal ramping limit),
2. A derivation of the various cost components is outlined in Appendix A of Wild et al. (2012a).
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where
PLq.> P lg., (lower hourly thermal ramping limit >  lower thermal MW capacity limit) 
and
PGf<P%. (upper hourly thermal ramping limit <  upper thermal MW capacity limit).
‘U’ = upper limit and ‘L’ = lower limit, A, and B, are linear and quadratic cost coefficients of the 
variable cost function.PG, is real (MW) power production level of generator ‘i’. Sk and dm are the 
voltage angles at nodes ‘k’ and ‘m’ (measured in radians). Parameter n is a positive soft penalty 
weight on the sum of squared voltage angle differences. Variables Ffc™ and F|;," are MW thermal 
limits associated with real power flows in the ‘normal’ and ‘reverse’ direction on each connected 
transmission branch km e BR.
The linear equality constraint refers to a nodal balance condition which requires that, at 
each node, power take-off (by LSE’s located at that node) equals power injection (by generators 
located at that node) and power transfers from other nodes on ‘connected’ transmission branches. 
On a node by node basis, the shadow price associated with this constraint gives the LMP associated 
with that node, i.e. regional wholesale electricity spot price. The linear inequality constraints ensure 
that real power transfers on transmission branches remain within thermal limits and the real power 
produced by each generator remains within lower and upper thermal limits while also meeting 
hourly ramping production limits.
It should be recognised that the ANEM model differs in significant ways from many of 
the wholesale electricity market models used to investigate the impact of carbon pricing on the 
Australian electricity industry. First, the nodal structure of the ANEM model is more disaggregated 
than the structure underpinning many of the other wholesale market models. Depending upon the 
treatment of Snowy Mountains Region in the NEM, the grid structures associated with wholesale 
market models used previously often involve five or six nodes (corresponding to each state region 
in the NEM) and six or seven inter-state interconnectors—see MMA (2006)3, ROAM (2008, Ap­
pendix A, p. II), SKM-MMA (2011, p. 62) and ACIL Tasman (2012, Section B.2). In contrast, the 
ANEM model contains 53 nodes and 72 transmission branches, including six inter-state intercon­
nectors and 66 intra-state transmission branches—see Wild et al (2012a), Figures 1-5. The ANEM 
model is also more disaggregated than the transmission grid structure adopted by AEMO for the 
National Transmission Network Development Planning (NTNDP) Process, see AEMO (2012a).
Second, the solution algorithm used in the ANEM model is very different conceptually 
from the linear programming algorithms used in many of the other wholesale market models. In 
the ANEM model, quadratic programming is employed to minimise both nodal angle differences 
and generator variable costs subject to network limits on transmission branches and generation. 
Optimal power flows on transmission branches are determined from optimised nodal angle differ­
ences. Optimised nodal angle differences depend on transmission branch adjacency and bus ad­
mittance properties determined from the transmission grid’s structure and branch reactance data 
(Sun and Tesfatsion 2007a, Section 4). Accounting for power flows in the equality constraints of
3. The mode] used in MMA (2006) further disaggregated the Queensland state region into four sub-regions MMA (2006, 
p. 50, 63).
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the DC OPF algorithm allows the incorporation of congestion components in regional wholesale 
spot prices. These congestion components can produce divergence in regional spot prices associated 
with congestion on intra-state transmission branches, thereby producing variation in regional and 
state averaged carbon pass-through rates.
In contrast, the linear programming algorithms do not explicitly optimise power flows as 
part of the optimisation process, directly capture the impact of branch congestion on spot prices or 
account for any impact associated with congestion on intra-state transmission branches. Moreover, 
intra-state regional spot prices are not typically defined in these models.
4. PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION CONSIDERATIONS
The solution algorithm employed involves applying the ‘competitive equilibrium’ solution. 
This means that all generators submit their true marginal cost coefficients and no strategic bidding 
is allowed, thus permitting assessment of the true cost of generation and dispatch. We also assume 
that all thermal generators are available to supply power during the whole period under investiga­
tion. This assumption avoids the effect that planned or unscheduled outages of thermal generators 
would have on increasing costs and prices by constraining the least cost supply response available 
by all generation to meet demand. Thus, our objective is to investigate, in an ideal setting, how the 
true cost of power supply changes for the various carbon prices compared to a BAU scenario 
involving no carbon price.
The implementation details relating to unit commitment features and dispatch of thermal 
and hydro plant are the same as outlined in (Wild et al. 2012a, Section 3). Recall that the contribution 
of non-scheduled wind generation has been included by being netted off from demand used in the 
modelling while semi-scheduled wind generation has been excluded.4 While all thermal generators 
were assumed available to supply power, the dispatch of thermal plant was optimised around as­
sumed availability patterns for hydro generation units where water supply is unconstrained. If water 
supply and hydro unit availability were constraining factors, this would increase costs and prices 
by constraining the least cost supply response available of all generation to meet demand. This 
follows because the supply offers of hydro plant would be significantly higher than the case where 
water supply did not constrain hydro generation availability.
Pump storage hydro unit supply offers were based upon short run marginal costs to ensure 
that dispatch occurs in a synchronised manner with pump actions. For all remaining hydro plant, 
hydro generator supply offers were based on long run marginal costs. This approach reflected the 
assumption that hydro plant supply offers on the mainland was assumed to shadow peak load gas 
plant. Annual capacity factors obtained were consistent with the provision of peak-load production 
duties by mainland hydro plant (Wild et al. 2012a, Section 4.3). Supply offers of TAS hydro 
generation plant were also based on long run marginal costs. Flowever, account was taken of the 
ability to provide baseload, intermediate or peak production duties when determining the long run 
marginal costs of TAS hydro plant. Annual capacity factors for TAS hydro generation were con­
sistent with this approach. See (Wild et al. 2012a, Section 4.3) for further details.
5. WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY PRICE IMPACTS
This section examines the effect of a carbon price on wholesale electricity prices. Moti­
vating this examination is Australia’s electricity generation sector’s high level of emissions by
4. Semi-scheduled wind generation only emerged in April 2009 and over the period 2007-2009 was therefore an insig­
nificant component of the available generation fleet.
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international standards, which account for around 35% of all C02 emissions in Australia (Simshauser 
2008, Simshauser and Doan 2009).
Figure 1 presents the average wholesale price for the years 2007 to 2009, for the NEM’s 
five states and whole of NEM for carbon prices ranging from $10/tC02 to $100/tC02.
The average prices reflect both a spatial and temporal dimension. For each hourly dispatch 
interval in a given year, an average state price level was calculated by averaging across all relevant 
nodal prices within each state. The average annual price level for each state was then calculated by 
averaging across the number of hours in each respective year. Then the average annual price for 
the NEM was calculated by averaging across the five state average annual prices obtained for each 
of the three years being investigated. The three-year average annual results outlined in Figure 1 
were then obtained by averaging across the yearly average annual price results obtained for years 
2007, 2008 and 2009.
Figure 1 shows that the most notable result is that for TAS. It experiences higher average 
prices for carbon prices up to $10/tCO2. This can be attributed to supply offers of TAS hydro plant 
being based on long run marginal costs. The resultant marginal cost is higher than those for thermal 
plant on the mainland. At higher carbon prices, electricity price rises more slowly than in other 
states. This is related to the possibility of trade with the mainland, via the Basslink Interconnector, 
which gives TAS exposure to cost structures and prices prevailing in VIC.5 As carbon prices
5. This observation is reinforced by very low levels of congestion on Basslink, which only begins to emerge for carbon 
prices of $90/tC02 and $100/tC02—see Table 18 of Wild et al. (2012a) for further details.
Copyright © 2015 by the IAEE. All rights reserved.
146 / The Energy Journal
increase, this promotes the increased dispatch of gas plant located at the George Town node, in 
particular. However, this growth is moderated by two factors. First, the variable cost structure of 
the predominantly hydro based generation fleet in TAS is unaffected by carbon costs. Specifically, 
given the regional demand profiles,6 as carbon prices increase, TAS hydro plant’s competitive 
position improves relative to other competing forms of generation, including thermal generation 
located in VIC. This promotes the increased dispatch of TAS hydro plant at the expense of output 
originating from VIC as carbon prices increase. Evidence of this is indicated in the reduction in 
power flows from VIC to TAS on the Basslink Interconnector at lower carbon prices and switch 
around to power exports from TAS to VIC at higher carbon prices as indicated in Table 17 of Wild 
et al. (2012a). Second, there emerges an increasing incidence of branch congestion on TAS intra­
state transmission branches in response to increased internal production from TAS hydro plant as 
carbon prices increase,—see Table 16 in Wild et al. (2012a) for further details. This congestion 
produces wholesale price divergence between nodes in TAS. In particular, emerging congestion on 
the George Town-Sheffield and Hadspen-Palmerston transmission branches would ensure that much 
of TAS would be quarantined from price rises occurring at the George Town node that is linked to 
price trends in VIC. These two factors ensure that the increase in average prices is well below that 
experienced in other states.
For the other states, QLD consistently has the lowest average prices. This reflects the 
availability of relatively new vintage black coal plant located in the South Burnett (e.g. Tarong) 
and South West QLD regions—see Figure 1 of Wild et al. (2012a). These are among the newest, 
cheapest and most emission friendly coal-fired generators in Australia. Furthermore, significant 
intermediate Open Cycle Gas Turbine (OCGT) [and emerging Natural Gas Combined Cycle 
(NGCC)] generators are located in South West QLD. These can be dispatched to meet peak load 
demand arising in the Greater Brisbane region, in conjunction with the NGCC Swanbank E and 
Wivenhoe pump-storage hydro power stations whose ramping capabilities can match peak-load 
demand but at significantly lower costs than conventional OCGT peak-load gas generation.
NSW follows a similar pattern to QLD excepting, on average, the NSW black coal fleet 
is of older vintage, marginally more costly and has slightly higher carbon-emission intensity rates. 
Similarly, key NGCC and pump-storage hydro plant is also located in major population centres: 
Sydney and Wollongong regions7. This plant is well placed to ramp up to meet peak demand in 
these major population centres. However, the intra-state branch congestion in northern NSW and 
the Hunter region promotes price divergence between NSW and QLD as displayed in Figure 1— 
see Tables 16 and 18 in Wild et al. (2012a).
In SA, there is NGCC and gas thermal plant located in the Greater Adelaide region that 
can meet peak load conditions in the region.8 This plant has the capacity to both set prices during 
peak demand periods and partially replace black coal generation located in the Upper North region 
of SA, as the carbon price increases. It has lower fuel and carbon costs than more conventional 
OCGT peaking gas plant and a variable cost structure that declines in relative terms to SA and VIC 
coal plant as the carbon price increases. Moreover, there is emerging evidence of branch congestion
6. It should be noted that by assuming that retail electricity demands exhibit negligible price sensitivity thereby reducing 
wholesale demand to daily supplied load profiles, we are excluding the possible impacts of a demand response to rising 
prices produced by the introduction of a carbon price signal. Thus, we are restricting analysis to consideration of the supply 
side response.
7. See Figure 2 of Wild et al. (2012a) for details.
8. See Figure 4 of Wild et al. (2012a) for details.
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on the Murraylink Interconnector for medium and high carbon prices which can drive price diver­
gence between VIC and SA prices as seen in Figure 1—see Table 18 in Wild et al. (2012a).
VIC consistently has the highest average wholesale prices for the three-year period and 
across all carbon prices considered. It has a traditional generation structure with brown coal gen­
eration used for base load and peak load met by OCGT peak gas or hydro plant. The brown coal 
generation, in the absence of a carbon price, is the cheapest in the country while the OCGT gas 
cost in VIC is more expensive than NGCC, Gas Thermal and intermediate OCGT plant located in 
other states. As such, with the incidence of peak load conditions in VIC and, to the extent that the 
marginal generator employs gas, it is likely to have a higher marginal cost structure than comparable 
units in other states.
However, NSW and VIC average prices seem to track closer together in Figure 1 at medium 
and higher carbon prices because there was very little branch congestion on intra-state and inter­
state transmission branches linking NSW and VIC—see Tables 16 and 18 of Wild et al. (2012a) 
for details.
Furthermore, at medium and higher carbon prices, gas generation in VIC becomes com­
petitive to coal, partially displacing brown coal generation while hydro generation in VIC becomes 
more competitive relative to OCGT generation as a marginal (peaking) generator—see Wild et al. 
(2012a, Section 4.3) for further details. This means that prices in both NSW and VIC increasingly 
become determined by hydro at higher carbon prices, which becomes the marginal generator and 
whose variable costs are unaffected by rising carbon prices. So, the correspondence between spot 
prices in both NSW and VIC shown in Figure 1 results from both the lack of transmission congestion 
and similar marginal cost structures of the marginal generator in both States.
6. CARBON PASS-THROUGH RATES
The rate of carbon pass-through is calculated in a two-step process. First, the price differ­
ence between average annual wholesale price with and without a carbon price is calculated. This 
price difference is then divided by the carbon price (Wild and Bell 2013). A rate less than unity 
implies less than complete pass-through of the carbon price into average annual wholesale prices. 
In contrast a rate greater than unity implies more than complete pass-through, e.g. the carbon price 
has a ‘magnified’ effect on average annual prices.
We calculated carbon pass-through rates for carbon prices ranging from $10/tCO2 to $ 100/ 
tC 02 incrementing by $ 10/tCO2 for the years 2007 to 2009. Table 1 shows the carbon pass-through 
rate averaged over the years 2007 to 2009. To see how sensitive the NEM average results are to 
the averaging operation adopted, we also derived a second set of NEM averages based on the state 
production shares listed in Table 1 of Nelson et al. (2010). The first set refers to simple arithmetic 
averages and are contained in column 7. The second set of weighted averages, termed ‘NEM*,’ are 
listed in the last column. This latter weighting scheme gives higher relative weight to QLD, NSW 
and VIC while reducing the relative weight attached to SA and TAS. These weighted average pass­
through averages for the NEM are higher for all carbon prices.
Table 1 shows that there is less than complete pass-through as all rates are less than unity. 
Understandably, given its significant hydro generation, the carbon pass-through rate for TAS is 
much lower than for the other states. Note that our pass-through rates for TAS are a little bit lower 
than those cited in ACIL Tasman (2012, p. 27) of 0.48.9
9. The carbon pass-through rates cited in ACIL Tasman (2012) are also ‘work-on’ rates.
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Table 1: 2007-2009 Average Carbon Pass-through Rates
Carbon Price QLD NSW VIC SA TAS NEM NEM*
$10/tC02 0.9177 0.8470 0.7994 0.8838 0.0869 0.7070 0.7981
$20/tC02 0.9165 0.8419 0.7944 0.8669 0.2794 0.7399 0.7963
$30/tC02 0.9150 0.8529 0.8160 0.8717 0.4338 0.7779 0.8086
$40/tC02 0.9079 0.8591 0.8304 0.8728 0.4332 0.7807 0.8135
$50/tC02 0.9032 0.8686 0.8483 0.8746 0.4116 0.7813 0.8209
$60/tC02 0.9038 0.8748 0.8615 0.8722 0.4128 0.7850 0.8272
$70/tC02 0.8996 0.8750 0.8639 0.8664 0.4114 0.7833 0.8267
$80/tC02 0.8974 0.8747 0.8634 0.8581 0.4083 0.7804 0.8254
$90/tC02 0.8967 0.8735 0.8608 0.8484 0.4045 0.7768 0.8235
$100/tC02 0.8969 0.8706 0.8554 0.8344 0.4000 0.7715 0.8202
A more surprising finding is the relatively low levels of carbon pass-through experienced 
in VIC up to $60/tCO2 compared to QLD, NSW and SA. This is surprising given the higher state 
carbon emissions intensity factor identified in Nelson et al. (2010) when compared to equivalent 
rates for the other three states. However, their carbon pass-through concept is, in the terminology 
of Sijm et al. (2006), the ‘add-on’ or generation carbon intensity rates. The estimates presented 
here are ‘work-on’ rates using the terminology of Sijm et al. (2006). It should be noted that ACIL 
Tasman (2012, p. 27) also obtained relatively low pass-through rates for VIC relative to QLD and 
NSW—e.g. 0.83 for QLD, 0.91 for NSW and 0.68 for VIC.
The trends from our modelling in relation to NSW and VIC are noteworthy given the 
relatively large size of both markets and different ‘add-on’ rates associated with the generation 
structure of both states. Specifically, Table 2 shows that for carbon prices below $80/tC07, the 
difference between average prices in VIC relative to BAU is lower when compared to NSW but 
also tends to approach the results of NSW as the carbon price level increases beyond $50/tC02 
before beginning to diverge somewhat for carbon prices greater than $80/tC02. This finding reflects 
the fact that lower end carbon prices can be absorbed, to a large extent, by VIC brown coal gen­
erators because of the very low marginal cost involved. However, by the time that the carbon price 
exceeds $50/tCO2, there has occurred a significant transition with a reduction in brown coal gen­
eration and an increase in the dispatch of gas and hydro plant in VIC and the carbon pass-through 
becomes broadly comparable to NSW, as outlined in Wild et al. (2012a, Section 4.3).
Table 1 shows QLD has the highest level of carbon pass-through at all carbon prices. This 
occurs because, at all carbon prices, the difference in average prices in QLD relative to BAU is 
higher when compared to other states, as shown in Table 2. This reflects two broad factors. First, 
congestion on transmission branches in northern NSW and the Hunter region of NSW promotes 
price separation between QLD and NSW. Second, at higher carbon prices, both newer vintage coal 
and NGCC generation partially displaces old and medium vintage coal production whilst OCGT 
gas generation, instead of hydro generation, increasingly plays the role of marginal generator in 
determining prices in QLD—see Wild et al. (2012a, Section 4.3). Note that our results for QLD 
differ from those obtained by ACIL Tasman (2012) who obtained a carbon pass-through rate of 
0.83. In their results, NSW was the state with the highest pass-through rate of 0.91. Difference in 
modelling assumptions between ANEM and ACIL Tasman (2012) can heuristically explain this
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Table 2: 2007-2009 Average Price Difference ($/MWh) Relative 
to BAU
Carbon Price QLD NSW VIC SA TAS
$10/tC02 9.18 8.69 8.35 8.95 0.69
$20/tC02 18.37 17.47 16.51 17.53 5.62
$30/tC02 27.51 26.19 25.40 26.52 13.40
$40/tC02 36.36 35.26 34.22 35.33 16.82
$50/tC02 45.18 44.12 43.47 44.24 19.10
$60/tC02 54.25 53.42 52.72 52.94 22.63
$70/tC02 62.90 62.13 61.48 61.23 26.07
$80/tC02 71.85 70.65 70.08 69.40 29.50
$90/tC02 80.81 79.37 78.61 77.36 32.83
$100/tC02 89.81 88.04 86.66 84.59 35.98
disparity such as differences in transmission grid structure, intra-state and inter-state power flows, 
levels of demand aggregation and supply offer behaviour.
Table 1 also shows that the carbon pass-through rate of SA is generally higher for small 
to moderate carbon prices but becomes lower, in comparison with NSW and VIC at higher carbon 
prices. This occurs because, at carbon prices greater than $60/tC02, the difference in average whole­
sale prices in SA relative to BAU is lower than the price differential in VIC and NSW, as shown 
in Table 2. This reflects the substitution of gas for coal generation as higher carbon prices reduce 
production levels from the latter towards each plant’s minimum stable operating level—see Wild 
et al. (2012a, Section 4.3). This, in turn, promotes the increased export of power from SA to VIC 
(especially for carbon prices of $40/tC02 and higher)—see Table 17 of Wild et al. (2012a). Increased 
congestion on the Murraylink Interconnector as the carbon price increases also promotes price 
separation between VIC and SA—see Table 18 of Wild et al. (2012a) for details. This would be 
capable of producing divergence between carbon pass-through rates associated with VIC and SA. 
Note that our results for SA also differ substantially from those cited in ACIL Tasman (2012) who 
obtained a carbon pass-through rate of 0.63.
For QLD and SA, the level of carbon pass-through generally declines as the carbon price 
increases. This again reflects the substitution of gas fired generation at the margin for black coal 
generation. This fuel switching becomes more prominent as carbon prices increase (Wild et al. 
2012a, Section 4.3).
Table 1 also shows NEM wide carbon pass-through rates for carbon prices between $20/ 
tCO, to $30/tC02 of between 0.74 and 0.78 and 0.80 and 0.81 respectively, depending on whether 
the ‘NEM’ or ‘NEM*’ weighting schemes are applied. These results can be compared with the 
0.85 ‘work-on’ rate cited in Department of Treasury (2011, p. 126). Similarly, given the state carbon 
pass-through estimates reported in ACIL Tasman (2012, p. 27) of 0.83 (QLD), 0.91 (NSW), 0.68 
(VIC), 0.63 (SA) and 0.48 (TAS), applying the ‘NEM’ and ‘NEM*’ weighting schemes to these 
numbers produces aggregate carbon pass-through rates of 0.71 and 0.79, respectively.
7. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The following findings have policy implications.
There is divergence in carbon pass-through rates between ‘work-on’ and ‘add-on’ rates. 
Nodal price equalisation when transmission branch congestion is absent and nodal price divergence
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when transmission branch congestion is present drives differences between ‘add-on’ and ‘work-on’ 
carbon pass-through estimates.
Carbon pass-through estimates are dependent upon the nodal location and the fuel-mix of 
generation plant within the transmission grid; for example, compare Tasmania’s carbon pass-through 
rates with those for the mainland states. Differences in rates also arise between the mainland States, 
reflecting differences in fuel-mix and vintage of generation plant, and with variation in the carbon 
price. Thus, the variability in carbon pass-through rates in relation to state location and carbon price 
raises questions about the efficacy of policy based on a single economy-wide carbon pass-through 
rate to determine retail electricity tariffs.
Retail commercial and industrial customers often use ‘Over-The-Counter’ (OTC) contracts 
to set retail electricity prices. In the OTC market, there is a standard clause that links the forward 
price to some agreed strike price related to expected energy cost plus a carbon cost component. 
This latter provision equates to the carbon price times the average carbon intensity (ACI) rate which 
references the whole of NEM carbon intensity (e.g. carbon pass-through) rate. The ACI concept 
does not attempt to capture the implications of differences in carbon pass-through rates of the 
different states. This could produce windfall gains (by retailers) by inflating contract prices if a 
state’s carbon pass-through rate is less than the ACI rate and losses by understating contract prices 
if the state’s carbon pass-through rate is greater than the ACI rate—see Wild et al. (2012b, Section 
7) for worked examples demonstrating this. This result implies that regional differences in carbon 
pass-through rates could be taken into account in the design of OTC hedge products, giving these 
products a spatial context. This would produce more efficient price signals by accounting for dif­
ferential impacts associated with differences in the generation fuel-mix and age of plant, installed 
generation capacity constraints, transmission infrastructure servicing the regional demand and trans­
mission constraints possibly arising at times of regional demand peaks. However, this improvement 
in efficiency would come at the expense of increased administrative complexity in both product 
detail and administrative costs in determining regional based carbon pass-through rates. Further­
more, while the focus of this article has been on a gross pool energy-only wholesale market structure, 
the principles could be readily extended to a net pool market structure based around a combined 
day-ahead and real time balancing market as well as longer horizon capacity market structures.
Divergence between ‘work-on’ and ‘add-on’ carbon pass-through rates also raises ques­
tions about partial compensation for adversely affected generation plant. In the current context, the 
measure of adversity would be directly related to the extent to which each generators ‘add-on’ 
carbon pass-through rate exceeds the relevant state ‘work-on’ carbon pass-through rate. The results 
indicate that coal generation plant in Victoria and, for higher carbon prices, coal plant in South 
Australia are absorbing carbon costs to a greater extent than black coal plant in New South Wales 
and Queensland. Moreover, black coal plant in New South Wales also absorbs carbon costs to a 
greater extent than is the case with black coal plant in Queensland.
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this article, we have reported on a detailed investigation of the ‘pass-through’ impact 
of carbon pricing on the wholesale price of electricity. We have examined the case of Australia 
which in 2012 introduced a starter carbon price of $23/tC02. A survey of the literature demonstrated 
that the concept of carbon pass-through is crucial to understanding and estimating the interaction 
between a carbon price and wholesale electricity prices. It was argued that to address this, a model 
of the national electricity market is required that contains many realistic features of what is a 
complex, networked system. Such features include intra-regional and inter-state trade, realistic
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transmission network pathways and the competitive dispatch of all generation with price determi­
nation based upon marginal cost and transmission branch congestion.
To capture these linkages, we used an agent-based model of the Australian National Elec­
tricity Market, incorporating a DC OPF algorithm to determine optimal dispatch of generation plant, 
power flows on transmission branches and wholesale prices.
There are a number of broad conclusions. First, T AS experienced higher average wholesale 
prices for zero or low carbon prices compared to other states while also experiencing much more 
modest growth in average wholesale electricity prices as the carbon price increases. This relates to 
how hydro generators in TAS were assumed to offer supply. For the mainland states, QLD consis­
tently had the lowest average wholesale prices, followed by SA and then NSW. VIC consistently 
has the highest average wholesale prices.
For all states, we found that there was less than complete pass-through of carbon price 
into average wholesale prices. We found significant variability in carbon pass-through rates across 
states and at different carbon prices, raising fundamental questions about the efficacy of using one 
single aggregate measure of carbon pass-through, such as the Average Carbon Intensity (ACI) rate 
that has been proposed in the standard clause provision in OTC market transactions. Furthermore, 
divergence between ‘work-on’ and ‘add-on’ carbon pass-through rates raises questions over the 
possibility of partial compensation of adversely affected coal plant in VIC and SA, and to a less 
extent, in NSW.
With regard to the robustness of our results, modelling based on past behaviour can, of 
course, never fully capture real events in the future. However, the modelling methodology has 
enabled us to create realistic scenarios that we would expect to hold up well for a number of years. 
Early indications support this—our estimates of increases in state level and NEM level electricity 
price rises, computed before the introduction of carbon pricing in July 2012, are very close to the 
actual outcomes and superior to the Australian Commonwealth Treasury’s estimate of the NEM 
electricity price rise (state estimates were not available). We would not expect our scenarios to be 
robust for carbon prices in excess of $70/tCO2 because, above that price, it is likely that renewables, 
nuclear, geothermal and/or carbon capture and storage will begin to play a more significant role in 
electricity generation. Furthermore, future trends in coal and especially gas prices will affect sub­
stitution of fuels and thermal generation production patterns which, with growth in renewables, is 
also likely to lead to new network investment over time that together can affect outcomes. But, 
right now, these outcomes and their relative contributions, perhaps decades ahead, reside in the 
domain of uncertainty and are, thus, not amenable to realistic scenario modelling.
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